Süleyman Soylu, Minister of Internal Affairs
In the wake of the local elections that cost AKP Istanbul and Ankara among many other major municipalities, I want to focus on AKP's historical alliances and struggles to make sense of these very important losses. Yet, I am afraid I will end up raising more questions than I answer. After almost two years of absence, I return with a somewhat confused post.
AKP's perhaps most important struggle had been against the traditional Republican establishment. Similar to her predecessors (such as Welfare Party or Virtue Party), AKP was a suspect despite incredible election wins throughout 2000s. AKP consolidated a broad and solid base of support, but faced strong pressure from the judiciary and the military. This story in itself was not new in Turkey at all. The Republic's counter-majoritarian guardians (embodied by the judiciary and the military) had taken down many quite popular governments in the 20th century. What was really unique in AKP's case was her ultimate success in subduing these institutions throughout 2010s and putting an end to the rule of the Republican guardians. This is the first axis I want to underline: AKP majoritarianism overcame Republican counter-majoritarianism.
How did AKP manage to dismantle the Republican establishment? Was it truly a democratic success story? In other words, can we comfortably argue that AKP was able to overcome Republican counter-majoritarianism thanks to her broad electoral support? The electoral support was inevitably important however, what we have learnt about AKP throughout the 2010s indicate how little we know about the state in Turkey. As we clearly know now, AKP won elections and subdued the Republican establishment with an unofficial coalition partner: The Gülen Movement. After the unsuccessful coup attempt in 2016, this movement is now known as FETÖ (a somewhat derogatory acronym for Fethullah Terrorist Organization) and its members are hunted down, although the entire AKP movement had embraced the Gülen movement throughout 2000s. We did not know much about the Gülen Movement back in 2000s, and honestly we still do not know much. What we know for sure is that this movement, which was inspired by a Muslim cleric, aimed for decades to infiltrate different echelons of the state structure and had been increasingly successful in that endeavor after AKP's rise to power. Since their break-up, tens of thousands of people had been fired and imprisoned.
In my earlier blogs, you can read about my take on the struggles between the Gülen movement and AKP. What has become more and more clear in the past few years is AKP's replacement for the Gülen movement: The ultra-nationalist movement which is often associated with the deep state. I am aware that the phrase "deep state" is increasingly popular in the American context, and even sometimes with reference to Turkey. What does the "deep state" mean? In essence, deep state implies the somewhat hidden existence of certain officials within the state structure that easily defy elected authorities, determine/derail policies and/or limit the spectrum of legitimate policy choices. After dismantling the Republican establishment, AKP literally fought a war with her former unofficial coalition partner (the Gülen movement), and entered into yet another unofficial coalition with the ultra nationalists. This new unofficial coalition is very clearly visible in AKP and Erdoğan's polarizing discourse, the end of the peace process with the Kurds, the imprisonment of HDP members and leaders (including the charismatic Selahattin Demirtaş), formal cooperation with the ultra-nationalist MHP in elections, and the appointment of Süleyman Soylu as the Minister of Internal Affairs. (To appreciate the power and immunity of this minister in Erdoğan's cabinet, please watch this interaction between him and Berat Albayrak, Erdoğan's son-in-law and the Minister of Economy). This will be the second axis I want to underline: AKP's changing alliances with shady/dark organizations which seem to share the identical goals of colonizing the state.
Here is the paradox of AKP majoritarianism: AKP had to fight the Republican establishment to establish herself as the legitimate representative of the people. In order to fight this war, AKP relied on a coalition with a shady religious cult/ movement which sought to colonize the state. Later, in order to fight this colonization that threatened AKP to the core, AKP relied on a coalition with yet another shady (this time ultra-nationalist) movement which also seeks to colonize the state. What we are facing is the continuous need of Turkish Republic's historically most popular government to ally herself with shady counter-majoritarian movements that want to colonize the state.
I might talk more about this in later posts, (if the cats decide to come back to speculate in their garden more regularly,) but I will conclude with three observations. First, I am quite aware that this paradox is a moot point for those Marxists who identify AKP as a peon of capitalism's hegemony. According to this perspective, the electoral success is one of the ways through which hegemony sustains itself. Although I do not completely reject the lessons we can get from such a critical outlook, I intentionally assign intrinsic value to overwhelming electoral support. Consequently, as my second point, I would like to investigate why AKP did not feel sufficiently strong with her electoral support in her fights against the Republican establishment or the Gülen movement. Because, in both cases AKP was forced to these ugly coalitions with shady movements. Finally, this question is relevant because the nature of these coalition partners force AKP to certain political and ideological paths that are ultimately costly. We might quite comfortably argue that perhaps the most important reason for why AKP lost Istanbul and Ankara municipalities is how AKP's coalition with the ultra-nationalists pushed almost the entire Kurdish vote to the opposition. In other words, AKP's counter-majoritarian shady coalitions are ultimately eroding her spectacular electoral base. There again is the paradox.
